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The Government’s proposal for an ‘English only’ stage in the
House of Commons could create problems
The Coalition Government has proposed a new measure to counteract some of the asymmetries brought
about by devolution, which could see English MPs enjoying what amounts to a ‘Fourth Reading Veto’.  Andrew
Blick argues that this measure, if successful, could fundamentally change the way the House of Commons
deals with legislation, and makes the case for a more inclusive and less partisan approach to constitutional
reform.
Recent media reports suggest
that the government intends to
instigate a signif icant change
to the way in which Parliament
carries out one of  its most
f undamental f unctions: the
production of  legislation. Any
such development requires f ull
consideration not only on its
own merits, but f or the way it
f its into the overall
constitutional f ramework of
the UK. Piecemeal action, of
the sort f requently deployed in
the UK, could produce
unf ortunate consequences.
The government intends to
correct an anomaly raised by
asymmetrical devolution in the
UK. MPs representing
Commons constituencies in
Northern Ireland, Scotland and
Wales can vote on and debate on matters which have been devolved to their parts of  the UK and
consequently do not directly af f ect them; while English MPs cannot become involved in the same way in
devolved issues.
In theory this arrangement could lead to the passing of  a law which only af f ected England, despite being
opposed by a majority of  English MPs. Opinion research suggests that this posit ion is regarded as unf air in
England. There is an important party polit ical dimension, too. The Conservatives have relatively greater
Commons representation in England than in other parts of  the UK. Consequently, any arrangement that
gave a specif ic parliamentary voice to England could be seen as enhancing the Conservative posit ion.
Unsurprisingly the party has long advocated ref orm in this area.
The Coalit ion agreement struck between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in May 2010 contained a
commitment to establish what became the Commission on the consequences of  devolution f or the House
of  Commons with William Mckay, f ormer Clerk of  the House of  Commons, in the chair. It reported in March
this year. The Commission advocated the principle that decisions impacting specif ically on England should
usually only be taken with the consent of  the majority of  English MPs (and an adapted version of  this
principle should apply to measures with an ef f ect on England and Wales). It of f ered a range of  possible
procedural options: an English Grand Committee voting on legislative consent motions bef ore the second
reading of  a bill; public bill committees composed of  English MPs; an English report committee, with an
option f or ‘repeal af ter report’; special committees in the Lords; English pre- legislative scrutiny; and
reporting which part of  the UK MPs come f rom in parliamentary voting lists.
In its response to the Commission, the Coalit ion is reportedly intent upon introducing, through changes to
the Commons Standing Orders, what would be in ef f ect a ‘f ourth reading’ stage to bills. English MPs would
by this means be given the right to register their approval or otherwise of  legislation – or perhaps clauses
within legislation – that is specif ic to England. Whether or not English MPs would possess an absolute
veto, or simply the right to ask Parliament as a whole to look again is unclear. But policy areas that are key
f or any government would be covered, amongst them health, education, housing and local government.
It is important to place this possible change in its wider context. The UK is passing through a phase of
enormous constitutional change. It can be traced to the 1990s, and particularly 1997 when Tony Blair and
New Labour took of f ice. The measures introduced under the last government included devolution to
Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and London; the incorporation of  the European Convention on Human
Rights into domestic law through the Human Rights Act 1998; the creation, by the Freedom of  Inf ormation
Act 2000, of  a statutory right to apply f or of f icial inf ormation; the establishment of  a UK Supreme Court
through the Constitutional Ref orm Act 2005; and, under the Constitutional Ref orm and Governance Act
2010, the placing of  the Civil Service on a statutory basis.
The period since May 2010 has seen f urther dramatic constitutional developments. The f ormation of  a
Coalit ion was itself  a remarkable event, since entit ies of  this kind, once a regular f eature of  UK
government, were previously unknown to the post-Second World War period. We have seen a UK
ref erendum on electoral ref orm, with a f urther vote on Scottish independence on the way. Fixed-term
parliaments of  f ive years duration have been established. The powers of  the Welsh Assembly have been
extended, as will those of  the Scottish Parliament under the Scotland Act 2012 if  Scotland remains within
the UK. Directly-elected police commissioners are in place. The European Union Act 2012 creates a
requirement to hold ref erendums on f urther pooling of  UK sovereignty at EU level. There is more still to
come. The government is in the process of  implementing amendments to the royal rules of  succession. It
wants to introduce changes to the Civil Service that would call into question its impartiality principles. A
ref erendum on posit ion of  the UK within the EU is a distinct possibility.
Many of  these measures were desirable and have proved worthwhile. But they have not always been
executed in a suf f iciently considered manner. Ref orms may be proposed without suf f icient thought given to
their f ull consequences or how they interact with each-other. Notoriously, in 2003 the government
announced by press release it was abolishing the of f ice of  Lord Chancellor, then realised it could not be
done. In 2011, voters were asked to decide on the voting system f or the House of  Commons without yet
knowing what would be the precise content of  plans then being considered f or an elected House of  Lords.
A complete masterplan is neither realisable nor desirable in a democracy. But the ‘f ourth reading’ proposal
does suggest the time is becoming ripe f or some kind of  constitutional convention to take a constitutional
overview, though one which cannot be held until Scotland has made a decision about its f uture in 2014.
This body could be cross-party in nature and incorporate a popular element. It could address questions
specif ic to the ‘f ourth reading’ idea, and other related issues. They might include:
How would a UK government f unction in the – entirely plausible – circumstances of  the Labour Party
winning a majority of  MPs in the Commons as a whole, but not amongst English MPs, making problems f or
a Labour government in key legislative areas? What would prevent the Labour Party f rom using its UK
parliamentary majority to amend the standing orders again, removing provision f or the f ourth reading
process? Are there other procedural devices it could use to bypass the f ourth reading? Might it be choose
increasingly to use executive action under existing legislation, rather than introduce new legislation?
If  regional devolution takes place within England at some point in the f uture, what might be the impact upon
the voting rights of  MPs f rom the devolved English regions? Or is this measure the alternative to English
devolution, precluding its enactment?
What are the appropriate means of  taking decisions about the introduction and extension of  devolution,
including to England? What are the limits to devolution?
Is a unif ied Civil Service a sustainable proposition in the post-devolution era?
How might a ref ormed second chamber f it within developing arrangements f or the territorial governance of
the UK?
What is the best way of  taking major constitutional decisions? How much consensus is needed? Should
such decisions be entrenched in some way once taken, and if  so how?
If  it proved possible to set up a constitutional convention considering these issues, a more considered and
inclusive, and less partisan, approach to constitutional change might be possible.
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